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Awerbuch and Scheideler have shown that peer-to-peer overlay networks can survive
Byzantine attacks only if malicious nodes are not able to predict what will be the topology
of the network for a given sequence of join and leave operations. In this paper we inves-
tigate adversarial strategies by following specific protocols. Our analysis demonstrates
first that an adversary can very quickly subvert overlays based on distributed hash tables
by simply never triggering leave operations. We then show that when all nodes (honest
and malicious ones) are imposed on a limited lifetime, the system eventually reaches a
stationary regime where the ratio of polluted clusters is bounded, independently from
the initial amount of corruption in the system.
1. Introduction
The adoption of peer-to-peer overlay networks as a building block for architecting
Internet scale systems has raised the attention of making these overlays resilient
not only to benign crashes, but also to malicious failure models [1, 2, 3]. As a result,
∗A shorter version of this paper appeared in the 2nd International Workshop on Reliability, Avail-
ability and Security (WRAS), February 2010.
†Supported by the Direction Ge´ne´rale des Entreprises - P2Pim@ges project
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Byzantine-resilient overlays have been proposed (e.g., [4, 5, 6, 7]). Awerbuch and
Scheideler [8] have shown that peer-to-peer overlay networks can survive Byzantine
attacks only if malicious nodes are not able to predict what will be the topology
of the network for a given sequence of join and leave operations. A prerequisite for
this condition to hold is to guarantee that nodes identifiers randomness is continu-
ously preserved. However this is not sufficient as by holding a logarithmic number
of addresses the adversary can disconnect some target from the overlay in a linear
number of trials. Similarly, randomly placing data in the network, as operated in
unstructured overlay networks, guarantees that data are difficult to attack however
requires a linear number of queries to be retrieved which is not scalable [9]. In-
ducing churn has been shown to be the other fundamental ingredient to preserve
randomness. Churn is classically defined as the rate of turnover of peers in the
system [10], and thus induced churn refers to the general idea of forcing peers to
move within the system. Several strategies based on this principle have been pro-
posed. Most of them are based on locally induced churn. However either they have
been proven incorrect or they involve a level of complexity that is too high to be
practically acceptable [8]. The other ones, based on globally induced churn, enforce
limited lifetime for each node in the system. This keeps the system in an unnec-
essary hyper-activity, and thus needs to impose strict restrictions on nodes joining
rate which limits its applicability to open systems.
In this paper we propose to leverage the power of clustering to design a practi-
cally usable solution that preserves randomness under an adaptive adversary. Our
solution relies on the clusterized version of peer-to-peer overlays combined with
a mechanism that allows the enforcement of limited nodes lifetime. Cluster-based
overlays have revealed to be well adapted for reducing both the impact of churn
on the system and the damage caused by failures in the absence of targeted at-
tacks [6, 11, 4]. The contributions of this paper are two-fold. We first investigate
adversarial strategies by following specific protocols. Our analysis demonstrates
that an adversary can very quickly subvert cluster-based overlays by simply never
triggering leave operations. We then show that when all nodes are imposed on a
limited lifetime, the system eventually reaches a stationary regime where the ratio
of polluted clusters is bounded.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we briefly
describe the main features of cluster-based overlays, and their dependability issues.
Section 3 presents the overlay operations. In Section 4 the adversarial behavior is
modeled and its impact at cluster level by using a Markovian analysis is studied. In
this section, we consider a non restricted adversary. Section 5 is devoted to the same
study in the case of a restricted adversary. Section 6 shows that by inducing churn
at all peers of the system, safety of the system is preserved. Section 7 demonstrates
the practicability of our solution. We conclude in Section 8.
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2. Overlay Networks
An overlay network is a virtual network built on top of a physical network. Nodes
of the overlay, usually called peers, communicate among each other along the edges
of the overlay by using the communication primitives provided by the underlying
network (e.g., IP network service). The algorithms that peers use to choose their
neighbors and to route messages define the overlay topology. The topology of un-
structured overlays conforms with random graphs, i.e., relationships among peers
are mostly set according to a random process which makes joining and leaving
operations constraint free. Data placement enjoy the same absence of constraints.
Any data can be placed on any peer thereby imposing flooding or random walk
techniques to retrieve them. Randomly placing data in the network guarantees that
data is difficult to attack but requires a linear number of queries to be retrieved
which is definitively not scalable [9]. This scalability issue can be circumvented at
the price of strong restrictions on churn [12]. Structured overlays (also called Dis-
tributed Hash Tables (DHTs)) build their topology according to structured graphs
(e.g., hypercube, torus). For most of them, the following principles hold: each peer
is assigned a unique random identifier from an m-bit identifiers space. Identifiers
(denoted IDs in the following) are derived by applying some standard cryptographic
one-way hash function on the peers network address. The value of m (128 for the
standard MD5 hash function) is large enough to make the probability of identi-
fiers collision negligible. The identifier space is partitioned among all the peers of
the overlay. Peers self-organize within the structured graph according to a distance
function D based on peers IDs (e.g., two peers are neighbors if their IDs share some
common prefix), plus possibly other criteria such as geographical distance. Each
application-specific object, or data-item, is assigned a unique identifier, called key,
selected from the same m-bit identifiers space. Each peer p owns a fraction of all the
data items of the overlay. The mapping derives from the distance function D. In the
following, we will use the term peer (or key) to refer to both the peer (or key) and
its m-bit representation. Following the seminal work of Plaxton et al [13], diverse
DHTs have been proposed (e.g., CAN [14], Chord [15], Pastry [16], Kademlia [17]).
All these DHTs have been proven to be highly satisfactory in terms of efficiency
and scalability (i.e., their key-based routing interface guarantees operations whose
complexity in messages and latency usually scale logarithmically with system size).
However, in presence of adversarial behavior, relying on single peers to ensure the
system connectivity and the correct retrieval of data is clearly not sufficient, as by
holding a logarithmic number of addresses the adversary can in a linear number of
trials disconnect some target from the overlay. On the contrary, by having peers
gathered into quorums or clusters, one can introduce the unpredictability required
to deal with Byzantine attacks through randomized algorithms. This has led to
cluster-based structured overlay networks.
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2.1. Cluster-based Structured Overlay Networks
Cluster-based structured overlay networks are such that clusters of peers substitute
for peers at the vertices of the structured graph. Each vertex of the structured graph
is composed of a set or cluster of peers. Peers join the clusters according to a given
distance metric D. For instance in PeerCube [6], peer p joins the (unique) cluster
whose label is a prefix of p’s identifier, while in eQuus [11], p joins the (unique)
cluster whose members are geographically the closest to p. Clusters in the overlay
are uniquely labelled. Size of each cluster is both lower and upper bounded. The
lower bound, named c in the following, usually satisfies some constraint based on
the assumed failure model. For instance c ≥ 4 allows Byzantine tolerant agreement
protocols to be run among these c peers despite the presence of one Byzantine
peer [18]. The upper bound, that we call Smax, is typically in O(logU) where U is
the current number of peers in the overlay, to meet scalability requirements. Once
a cluster size exceeds Smax, this cluster splits into two smaller clusters, each one
populated with the peers that are closer to each other according to distance D.
Once a cluster undershoots its minimal size c, this cluster merges with the closest
cluster in its neighborhood. For space reasons we do not give any detail regarding
localization of a cluster in the overlay nor the split/merge operations. None of
these processes are strictly necessary to understand our work. The interested reader
is invited to read their descriptions in the original papers (e.g. [4, 6, 11]).
In the present work we assume that at cluster level, peers are organized as core
and spare members. Members of the core set are primarily responsible for handling
messages routing and clusters operations. Management of the core set is such that
its size is maintained to constant c. Spare members are the complement number of
peers in the cluster. Size s of the spare set is such that s ≤ S where S = Smax − c.
In contrast to core members, spare members are not involved in any of the overlay
operations. Rationale of this classification is two-fold: first it allows to introduce the
unpredictability required to deal with Byzantine attacks through a randomized core
set generation algorithm as shown in the sequel. Second it limits the management
overhead caused by the natural churn present in typical overlay networks through
the spare set management. In the following we assume that join and leave events
have an equal chance to occur in any cluster.
2.2. Dependability Issues
A fundamental issue faced by any practical open system is the inevitable presence
of peers that try to manipulate the system by exhibiting undesirable behaviors [3].
Such peers are classically called malicious or Byzantine. Malicious peers can devise
complex strategies to prevent peers from discovering the correct mapping between
peers and data keys. They can mount Sybil attacks [19] (i.e., an attacker generates
numerous fake peers to pollute the system), they can do routing-table poisoning
(also called eclipse attacks [1, 3]) by having honest peers redirecting outgoing links
towards malicious ones, or they can simply drop or re-route messages towards other
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malicious peers. They can magnify their impact by colluding and coordinating their
behavior. We model these strategies through a strong adversary that controls these
malicious peers. We assume that the adversary has large but bounded resources in
that it cannot control more than a fraction µ (0 < µ < 1) of malicious peers in the
whole network. Note that in the following we make a difference between the whole
network and the overlay. The network encompasses all the peers that at some point
may participate to the overlay (i.e. 2m peers), while the overlay contains at any time
the subset U of participating peers. Thus, while µ represents the assumed fraction
of malicious peers in the network, the goal of the adversary is to populate some
parts of the overlay with a larger fraction of malicious peers in order to subvert the
correct functioning of the overlay. Finally, a peer which always follows the prescribed
protocols is said honest. Note that honest peers cannot a priori distinguish honest
peers from malicious ones.
2.3. Security Schemes
We assume the existence of a public key cryptography scheme that allows each peer
to verify the signature of each other peer. We also assume that correct peers never
reveal their private keys. Peers IDs and keys (private and public) are acquired via
a registration authority. When describing the protocols, we ignore the fact that
messages are signed, and recipients of a message ignore any message that is not
signed properly. We also use cryptographic techniques to prevent a malicious peer
from observing or unnoticeably modifying a message sent by a correct peer. However
a malicious peer has complete control over the messages it sends and receives.
3. Operations of the Overlay
When a peer joins a cluster or leaves it, corresponding operations are executed.
Design of these operations takes advantage of peers role separation. The leave
operation for peers in the core set introduces a certain amount of unpredictability
required to deal with Byzantine attacks through a randomized core set generation
algorithm. On the other hand both leave operations for peers in the spare set and
join operations have no impact on the overall topology (provided that the size of
the concerned cluster does not reach its lower or upper bounds) discouraging brute
force denial of service attacks. Specifically:
· join(p): when peer p joins the system, it joins the spare set of the closest
cluster G in the system (according to distance D). Core member of G update their
spare view to reflect p’s insertion (note that the spare view update does not need
to be tightly synchronized among all core members).
· leave(p): when peer p leaves its cluster G, either p belongs to G spare view
or to G core view. In the former case, core members of G simply update their spare
view to reflect p’s departure, while in the latter case the core view maintenance
procedure is triggered. Two maintenance procedures are analyzed. The first one,
called procedure1, simply consists in replacing the left core member by one randomly
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chosen among the spare members. The second one, called procedure2, consists in
renewing the whole core set by choosing c random peers among the whole cluster.
The join and leave operations make up the cluster protocol. In the following
Protocol1 refers to a leave(.) operation followed by a join(.) operation with proce-
dure1 as maintenance procedure. Similarly, Protocol2 refers to a leave(.) operation
followed by a join(.) operation using procedure2.
4. Modeling the Adversarial Strategy in a Cluster
In this section, we investigate to which extent the two previously described proto-
cols, i.e., Protocol1 and Protocol2, prevent the adversary from elaborating deter-
ministic strategies to compromise the correctness of a targeted cluster G. Correctness
of a cluster is compromised as soon as a quorum of core members are malicious.
Specifically, in both maintenance procedures, core members trigger a Byzantine-
resilient consensus algorithm to agree on the composition of the renewed core view.
It is well-known that a necessary and sufficient condition to prevent agreement
among a set of nodes is that strictly more than a third of these nodes are mali-
cious [18]. In our context, cluster G is said polluted if its core set is populated by
strictly more than ⌊(c− 1)/3⌋ malicious peers, with c the size of the core set. In the
following, we denote by c′ the value ⌊(c− 1)/3⌋.
Both Protocol1 and Protocol2 are modeled by using the ball and urn model
as presented in Figure 1. Specifically, the very large number of peers in the network
is depicted by a potentially infinite number of white and red balls in a bag. White
balls represent honest peers, while red ones represent malicious peers. There is a
proportion 1−µ of white balls and a proportion µ of red balls in the bag. In addition
to the bag, we consider two urns, referred to as C and S in the following, which
respectively represent the core set and the spare set of a cluster. Join and leave
operations are modeled through the throwing and withdrawing of balls into and
from the urns. For instance, drawing a ball from the bag and throwing this ball
into S models the insertion of a new peer into the overlay and its joining into the
spare set of a cluster. Drawing a ball from S ∪ C and throwing this ball into the
bag models the leaving of a peer from the overlay. In Figure 1, both protocols are
made of two indivisible tasks. Task 1 models the random choice of a peer within a
cluster while Task 2 is concerned with the leave and join operations. We consider a
succession of rounds r1, r2, . . . during which the rules of the protocols are applied.
Rules are oblivious to the color of the balls, meaning that they cannot distinguish
between the white and the red balls.
As previously said the goal of the adversary is to maximize the number of red
balls in both urns C and S so that the number of red balls in C is bound to always
exceed quorum c′ = ⌊(c − 1)/3⌋. By construction, the adversary has only access
to red balls. Thus an effective strategy for the adversary to gain this quorum is to
prevent red balls from being extracted from both urns. Specifically, in Task 1 of
both protocols (see Figure 1), if the drawn ball b0 is red then this ball is put back
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/* Protocol1*/
/* Task 1 */
draw a ball b0 from C ∪ S
/* Task 2 */
if b0 ∈ C then
draw a ball b1 from S
throw b1 into C
endif
throw b0 into the bag
draw a ball b2 from the bag
throw b2 into S
/* Protocol2*/
/* Task 1 */
draw a ball b0 from C ∪ S
/* Task 2 */
if b0 ∈ C then
throw all the balls of C into S
draw c balls from S
and throw these c balls into C
endif
throw b0 into the bag
draw a ball b2 from the bag
throw b2 into S
Fig. 1. Rules of Protocol1 and Protocol2.
into the urn it was drawn from (i.e., either C or S). In that case, Task 2 is not
applied, and a new round is triggered. This strategy ensures that the number of red
balls in C ∪ S is non decreasing.
We model the effects of rounds r1, r2, . . . using a homogeneous Markov chain
denoted by X = {Xn, n ≥ 0} representing the evolution of the number of red
balls in both urns C and S. More formally, the state space Ω of X is defined by
Ω = {(x, y) | 0 ≤ x ≤ c, 0 ≤ y ≤ s}, and for n ≥ 1 the event Xn = (x, y) means
that after the n-th transition or n-th round the number of red balls within urn C is
equal to x and the number of red balls within urn S is equal to y. The transition
probability matrix P of X depends on both the rules of the given protocol and the
adversarial behavior. This matrix is detailed in each of the following subsections.
We define a state as polluted if in this state urn C contains strictly more than
c′ = ⌊(c− 1)/3⌋ balls. Conversely, a state that is not polluted is said to be safe. In
the remaining of this paper, the initial probability distribution is denoted by α.
4.1. Protocol1
Regarding Protocol1, the subset of safe states A is defined as A = {(x, y) | 0 ≤
x ≤ c′, 0 ≤ y ≤ s}, while the set of polluted states B, is the subset Ω − A,
i.e., B = {(x, y) | c′ < x ≤ c, 0 ≤ y ≤ s}. By the rules of Protocol1, one can
never escape from the subset of states B to switch back to safe states A since the
number of red balls in C is non decreasing. Thus, the adversary wins the protocol
when process X reaches the closed subset B, as illustrated in Figure 2. Matrix P
and the initial probability vector α are partitioned in a manner that matches the
decomposition of Ω = A ∪B, that is
P =
(
PA PAB
0 PB
)
and α = (αA αB),
where PA (resp. PB) is the sub-matrix of dimension |A| × |A| (resp. |B| × |B|),
containing the transitions between states of A (resp. B); PAB is the sub-matrix of
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dimension |A| × |B|, containing the transitions from states of A to states of B; B
is an absorbing class thus PBA = 0. Finally, sub-vector αA (resp. αB) contains the
initial probabilities of states of A (resp. B).
A B
Fig. 2. Aggregated view of the Markov chains associated with Protocol1. Safe states are
represented by A, and polluted ones by B. B is an absorbing class.
The computation of the transition probabilities of matrix P is illustrated in
Figure 3. In this tree, each edge is labelled by a probability and its corresponding
event according to the rules of Protocol1. This figure can be interpreted as follows:
At round r, r ≥ 1, starting from state (x, y) (root of the tree), the Markov chain
can visit four different states, namely (x, y), (x, y+1), (x+1, y− 1), and (x+1, y)
(leaves of the tree). The probability associated with each one of these transitions is
obtained by summing the products of the probabilities discovered along each path
starting from the root to the leaf corresponding to the target state. Derivation of
the transition probability matrix P of Markov chain X associated with Protocol1
is as follows: for all x ∈ {0, . . . , c} and for all y ∈ {0, . . . , s}, we have
p(x,y),(x,y) =
(
1
c+ s
)(
x+
(c− x)(s− y)(1− µ)
s
+ y + (s− y)(1− µ)
)
p(x,y),(x,y+1) =
(c+ s− x)(s− y)µ
(c+ s)s
for y ≤ s− 1
p(x,y),(x+1,y−1) =
(c− x)y(1− µ)
(c+ s)s
for x ≤ c− 1 and y ≥ 1
p(x,y),(x+1,y) =
(c− x)yµ
(c+ s)s
for x ≤ c− 1.
In all other cases, transition probabilities are null.
4.2. Protocol2
For s = 1, it is easy to see that Protocol2 is equivalent to Protocol1. On the other
hand, in contrast to Protocol1, Protocol2 alternates between safe and polluted
states. After a random number of these alternations the process enters a set of
closed polluted states. Indeed, by the rules of the protocol, one can escape finitely
often from polluted states (x, y) to switch back to safe states as long as (x, y)
satisfies x + y < s + c′ (there are still sufficiently many white balls in both C and
S so as to successfully withdraw c balls such that C is safe). However, there always
exists a round such that a state (x, y) is entered, where x + y ≥ s + c′. From this
round onwards, going back to safe states is impossible: the adversary has won the
protocol. Formally, the subset of safe states A is defined, as for Protocol1, by
A = {(x, y) | 0 ≤ x ≤ c′, 0 ≤ y ≤ s}. On the other hand we need to decompose
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(x, y)
(x, y)
(b0 is red)
x
c
(x + 1, y − 1)
(b2 is white) 1 − µ
(x + 1, y)
µ (b2 is red)
(b1 is red)
y
s
(x, y + 1)
µ
(x, y)
1 − µ (b2 is white)
s−y
s
(b1 is white)
c−x
c
(b0 is white)
(b0 ∈ C)
c
c+s
(x, y)
(b0 is red)
y
s
(x, y)
1 − µ
(x, y + 1)
µ (b2 is red)
1
s−y
s
(b0 is white)
s
s+c
(b0 ∈ S)
Fig. 3. Transition diagram for the computation of matrix P of Protocol1.
the set B of polluted states into two subsets C and D defined by C = {(x, y) | x >
c′, x+ y < s+ c′, 0 ≤ y ≤ s}, and D = {(x, y) | x > c′, x+ y ≥ s+ c′, 0 ≤ y ≤ s}.
When s = 1, we have B = D and C = ∅. Subsets A and C are transient and subset
D is a closed subset as illustrated in Figure 4.
A C D
Fig. 4. Aggregated view of the Markov chains associated with Protocol2. Safe states are
represented by A, and polluted states by C and D. State D is an absorbing class.
Following the decomposition of Ω = A ∪ C ∪D, we partition matrix P and the
initial probability vector α by writing
P =

 PA PAC PADPCA PC PCD
0 0 PD

 and α = (αA αC αD).
By proceeding similarly as in Section 4.1, we derive the transitions of process
X associated with Protocol2. Briefly, when the protocol starts in state (x, y) at
round r, it remains in state (x, y) during the round if either ball b0 is red or b0 is
white, it has been drawn from S, and b2 is white. It changes to state (x, y+1) if b0
is white, it has been drawn from S, and b2 is red. Finally the protocol switches to
state (k, x+ y− k+ ℓ), where k is an integer k = 0, . . . ,min(c, x+ y) and ℓ = 0, 1 if
b0 is white and it has been drawn from C, and the maintenance procedure leads to
the choice of k red balls. For all x ∈ {0, . . . , c}, y ∈ {0, . . . , s}, and s > 1, we have
p(x,y),(x,y) =
x
c+ s
+
y
c+ s
+
s− y
c+ s
(1− µ) +
c− x
c+ s
(1− µ)q(x, x+ y)
p(x,y),(x,y+1) =
s− y
c+ s
µ+
c− x
c+ s
µq(x, x+ y) for y ≤ s− 1
p(x,y),(k,x+y−k) =
(
c− x
c+ s
)
(1− µ) q(k, x+ y) for 0 ≤ k ≤ min(c, x+ y) and k 6= x
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p(x,y),(k,x+y−k+1) =
(
c− x
c+ s
)
µq(k, x+ y) for 0 ≤ k ≤ min(c, x+ y) and k 6= x
where
q(z, x+ y) =
(x+ y
z
)(c+ s− 1− (x+ y)
c− z
)
(c+ s− 1
c
) 1{0≤x+y−z≤s−1} (1)
is the probability of getting z red balls when c balls are drawn, without replacement,
in an urn containing x + y red balls and c + s − 1 − (x + y) white balls, referred
to as the hypergeometric distribution. 1{···} represents the indicator function. In all
other cases, transition probabilities are null.
4.3. Comparison of both Protocols in a Non Constrained
Adversarial Environment
As described in Section 4.1 the Markov chain X associated with Protocol1 is
reducible and the states of A are transient, which means that matrix I − PA is
invertible, where I is the identity matrix of dimension |A|. Recall that B is an
absorbing class, i.e. PBA = 0. Similarly, as described in Section 4.2, Markov chain
X associated with Protocol2 is reducible, the states of A and C are transient and
subset D is a closed subset.
4.3.1. Initial Distributions
In the experiments conducted for this work, we consider two initial distributions.
The first one, which we denote by β, consists in drawing c + s balls from the
bag such that c of them are thrown into urn C, and the other s ones are thrown
into urn S. This initial state X0 is defined by X0 = (Cr, Sr) where Cr (resp. Sr)
is the initial number of red balls in C (resp. S). Thus both Cr and Sr follow a
binomial distribution, and assuming they are independent, we get for x = 0, . . . , c
and y = 0, . . . , s
β(x, y) = P{Cr = x, Sr = y} =
(
c
x
)
µx(1− µ)c−x
(
s
y
)
µy(1− µ)s−y. (2)
The second one, that we denote δ, consists simply in starting from state (0, 0), that
is the state free from red balls, i.e.,
δ(x, y) = δ0xδ0y with δij the Kronecker delta. (3)
4.3.2. Sojourn Time of both Protocols in Safe States
We start our study by investigating for i = 1, 2 the distribution T
(i)
A which counts
the total number of rounds spent by Protocoli in the subset of safe states A before
absorption. Specifically T
(1)
A = inf{n ≥ 0 | Xn ∈ B}. The probability mass function
of T 1A for k ≥ 0 is easily derived as
P{T
(1)
A = k} =
{
αB✶ if k = 0
αA(PA)
k−1(I − PA)✶ if k ≥ 1
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where ✶ is the column vector with all components equal to 1. The cumulative
distribution function and the expectation of T
(1)
A are respectively given by
P{T
(1)
A ≤ k} = 1− αA(PA)
k
✶, and E(T
(1)
A ) = αA(I − PA)
−1
✶. (5)
Following the results obtained in Sericola [20], for Protocol2, the probability mass
function of T
(2)
A =
∑∞
n=1 1{Xn∈A} is given by
P{T
(2)
A = k} =
{
1− v✶ if k = 0
vRk−1(I −R)✶ if k ≥ 1
(6)
where v = αA + αC(I − PC)
−1PCA and R = PA + PAC(I − PC)
−1PCA. The cumu-
lative distribution function and expectation of T
(2)
A are respectively given by
P{T
(2)
A ≤ k} = 1− vR
k
✶, and E(T
(2)
A ) = v(I −R)
−1
✶. (7)
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(a) α = β (see Relation (2))
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(b) α = δ (see Relation (3))
Fig. 5. E(T
(1)
A ) (see Relation (5)) represented by dark bars and E(T
(2)
A ) (see Relation (7))
represented by light grey bars as a function of s and the percentage µ of red balls. Notation
5, 10, . . . 25 denotes µ = 5%, 10%, . . . , 25%. In all these experiments c = 10.
Figure 5(a) and Figure 5(b) compare the expected number of rounds run in safe
states for both protocols according to the two initial distributions β and δ. In
accordance with the intuition, increasing the size of the urns augments both E(T
(1)
A )
and E(T
(2)
A ) independently from the ratio of red balls in the bag. Similarly, for
a given cluster size, augmenting the ratio of red balls in the bag decreases both
E(T
(1)
A ) and E(T
(2)
A ). Now Figure 5(b) shows that for small values of µ Protocol2
overpasses Protocol1, while for larger values of µ, we observe an inverse tendency.
Interpretation of this result is as follows. When the size s of S is equal to 1, both
protocols are equivalent as illustrated in Figures 5(a) and 5(b). Now, consider the
case where the size s of S gets larger compared to C’s one. The probability to draw
a ball from S tends to 1. Now as the adversary never withdraws its red balls from
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any urns, the number of red balls within S is non decreasing. Hence, the larger µ is
the faster the ratio of red balls in S tends to 1. With small probability, a ball from
C is drawn. In Protocol1 it is replaced with high probability by a red ball drawn
from S. Hence to reach a polluted state, c′ + 1 white balls have to be replaced by
red ones. While with Protocol2 the renewal of C reaches with high probability a
polluted state in a single step. Thus, even if Protocol2 continues to alternate for
a finite number of times between safe and polluted subset of states, the total time
spent in safe states is less than the one spent by Protocol1. Note that one cannot
observe such a behavior when the initial ratio of red balls in both urns is non null
(see Figure 5(a)) as it takes less steps for both protocols to switch to polluted states.
4.3.3. Alternation between Safe and Polluted States of Protocol2
A deeper investigation of Protocol2 allows to study the duration and frequency
of successive sojourn times in subsets A and C. For n ≥ 1, we denote by T
(2)
A,n
(respectively T
(2)
C,n) the distribution of the time spent by the Markov chain X during
its n-th sojourn in subset A (resp. C). The total time spent in subset A (resp. C)
before reaching subset D is given by
T
(2)
A =
∞∑
n=1
T
(2)
A,n and T
(2)
C =
∞∑
n=1
T
(2)
C,n.
From Sericola and Rubino [21], we have for n ≥ 1 and k ≥ 0
P{T
(2)
A,n ≤ k} = 1− vG
n−1(PA)
k
✶, (9)
where v is defined in Relation (6) and G = (I − PA)
−1PAC(I − PC)
−1PCA. Sym-
metrically, we have
P{T
(2)
C,n ≤ k} = 1− wH
n−1(PC)
k
✶, (10)
where w = αC + αA(I − PA)
−1PAC and H = (I − PC)
−1PCA(I − PA)
−1PAC .
The expectations of T
(2)
A,n and T
(2)
C,n are respectively given by
E(T
(2)
A,n) = vG
n−1(I − PA)
−1
✶ and E(T
(2)
C,n) = wH
n−1(I − PC)
−1
✶. (11)
Figure 6(a) shows the expected duration and frequency of successive sojourn times
in subsets A and C for Protocol2.
a Clearly, the protocol runs more rounds in C
than it does in A. Note that for n ≥ 7, the expected duration of the sojourn times
in both A and C is already close to 0. Figure 6(b) depicts the percentage of rounds
spent by Protocol2 in safe states before absorption as a function of the size s of S.
This percentage is described by
E(T
(2)
A )
E(T
(2)
A ) + E(T
(2)
C )
=
v(I −R)−1✶
v(I −R)−1✶+ w(I − T )−1✶
(12)
aNote that if we consider the first sojourn time in the subset of safe states A of both protocols, then
Protocol1 always overpasses Protocol2 both in expectation and with respect to their cumulative
distribution functions [22])
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where v and R are given in Relation (6), w is given in Relation (10), and T =
PC+PCA(I−PA)
−1PAC . In accordance with the intuition, this percentage decreases
with larger values of µ, and stabilizes for increasing values of s.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150Rounds Number 
Polluted
 
Safe E(T (2)A;1 )
E(T (2)C;1 )
E(T (2)A;2 )
E(T (2)C;2 )
E(T (2)A;3 )
E(T (2)C;3 )
...
...
(a) Succession of E(T
(2)
A,n
) and E(T
(2)
C,n
) as a
function of the rounds number. We have α = β,
c = 10, s = 20 and µ = 25%.
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T(
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(T
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)
A
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T(
2) C
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mu=5%mu=10%mu=15%mu=20%mu=25%
(b) E(T
(2)
A
)/(E(T
(2)
A
) + E(T
(2)
C
)) as a function
of the size s of S. We have α = β, and c = 10.
Fig. 6. Sojourn Times in Transient States for Protocol2.
An aggregated view of the total
time spent in transient states, i.e.
A for Protocol1, and A ∪ C for
Protocol2, before absorption is de-
picted in Figure 7. The main ob-
servation drawn from this figure is
that the total time spent in transient
states linearly increases with the size
of S, and thus increases logarithmi-
cally with the size of the system. On
the other hand, this time is mainly
spent in C, and this tendency in-
creases with larger values of s which
is confirmed by Figure 6(b).
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s=40
Fig. 7. E(T
(1)
A
) (Relation (5)) represented by dark
colored bars, and E(T
(2)
A
)+E(T
(2)
C
) (Relation (12))
represented by light grey and grey colored bars as a
function of s and µ. In all these experiments c = 10.
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4.3.4. Lessons Learnt from this Comparison
The main lessons learnt from this preliminary study is that increasing the amount
of randomization of the protocol does make it necessarily more resilient to stronger
adversaries. From a practical point of view this result is interesting as handling the
renewal of a set of entities requires costly agreement protocols to be run among the
interested parties. Typically, complexity of these protocols is in O(n3) where n is
the number of parties. Unfortunately by allowing malicious peers to stay indefinitely
long at the same position in the overlay, both protocols are not sufficient to prevent
the adversary from progressively surrounding honest peers and gaining the quorum.
In the following section we show that by limiting the lifetime of malicious peers in
the same cluster, safety of the whole cluster is eventually guaranteed.
5. Constraining the Adversary by Limiting the Sojourn Time in a
Cluster
It has been shown [9] that structured overlays cannot survive targeted attacks if
the adversary may keep sufficiently long its malicious peers at the same position
in the overlay. Indeed, once malicious peers have succeeded in sitting in a focused
region of the overlay, they can progressively gain the quorum by simply waiting for
honest peers to leave their position, leading to the eventual isolation of honest peers.
The two fundamental properties that prevent peers isolation are the guarantee that
peers identifiers are random, and that peers cannot stay forever at the same position
in the system [8].
From a practical point of view, implementing limited peers lifetime and unpre-
dictable identifiers assignment, can be achieved by adding an incarnation number
to the fields that appear in the peer’s certificate (certificates are acquired at trust-
worthy Certification Authorities (CAs)), and by hashing this certificate to generate
the peer’s identifier. By the properties of hash functions, peers identifiers are un-
predictable. The incarnation number limits the lifetime of identifiers. The current
incarnation k of any peer p can be computed as k = ⌈(t − ivt)/L⌉, where ivt is
the initial validity time of the peer’s certificate, t is the current time, and L is the
length of the lifetime of each peer’s incarnation. Thus, the kth incarnation of peer
p expires when its local clock reads ivt+ kL. At this time p must rejoin the system
using its (k + 1)th incarnation. This is discussed in details in [22].
Coming back to our analysis, we model the constraint on the adversary by
preventing the adversary from keeping its red balls in both urns infinitely long, so
that randomness among red and white balls is continuously preserved. As previously,
we investigate both protocols presented in Figure 1. It is not difficult to see that
both protocols alternate between the subset of safe states A = {(x, y) | 0 ≤ x ≤
c′, 0 ≤ y ≤ s}, and the subset of polluted ones B = {(x, y) | c′ < x ≤ c, 0 ≤ y ≤ s}
for an infinite number of rounds. Both subsets A and B are transient, preventing the
adversary from ever winning any of the two protocols. Following the decomposition
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of Ω = A∪B, we partition matrix P and the initial probability vector α by writing
P =
(
PA PAB
PBA PB
)
and α = (αA αB).
5.1. Protocol1
By proceeding exactly as in Section 4, we derive the transition probability matrix
P for Protocol1. That is, for all x ∈ {0, . . . , c} and y ∈ {0, . . . , s}, we have
p(x,y),(x,y) =
xy + (c(s− y)− xs)(1− µ)
(c+ s)s
+
yµ+ (s− y)(1− µ)
c+ s
p(x,y),(x,y−1) =
(x+ s)y
(c+ s)s
(1− µ) for y ≥ 1
p(x,y),(x,y+1) =
(
c− x+ s
c+ s
)(
s− y
s
)
µ for y ≤ s− 1
p(x,y),(x+1,y−1) =
(c− x)y
(c+ s)s
(1− µ) for x ≤ c− 1 and y ≥ 1 (13)
p(x,y),(x+1,y) =
(c− x)y
(c+ s)s
µ for x ≤ c− 1
p(x,y),(x−1,y) =
x(s− y)
(c+ s)s
(1− µ) for x ≥ 1
p(x,y),(x−1,y+1) =
x(s− y)
(c+ s)s
µ for x ≥ 1 and y ≤ s− 1.
In all other cases, transition probabilities are null.
5.2. Protocol2
Similarly for all x ∈ {0, . . . , c} and y ∈ {0, . . . , s} the entries of P for Protocol2
are given by
p(x,y),(x,y) =
xq(x, x+ y − 1)µ
c+ s
+
(c− x)q(x, x+ y)(1− µ)
c+ s
+
yµ+ (s− y)(1− µ)
c+ s
p(x,y),(x,y−1) =
x
c+ s
q(x, x+ y − 1)(1− µ) +
y
c+ s
(1− µ) for y ≥ 1
p(x,y),(x,y+1) =
c− x
c+ s
q(x, x+ y)µ+
s− y
c+ s
µ for y ≤ s− 1
p(x,y),(k,x+y−k−1) =
x
c+ s
q(k, x+ y − 1)(1− µ)
for max(0, x+ y − 1− s) ≤ k ≤ min(c, x+ y − 1) and k 6= x (14)
p(x,y),(k,x+y−k) =
x
c+ s
q(k, x+ y − 1)µ+
c− x
c+ s
q(k, x+ y)(1− µ)
for max(0, x+ y − s) ≤ k ≤ min(c, x+ y − 1) and k 6= x
p(x,y),(k,x+y−k+1) =
c− x
c+ s
q(k, x+ y)µ
for max(0, x+ y + 1− s) ≤ k ≤ min(c, x+ y) and k 6= x,
where q(z, x+ y) is given by Relation (1). In all other cases, transition probabilities
are null.
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5.3. Comparison of both Protocols in a Constrained Adversarial
Environment
By proceeding as in Section 4.3.3, we investigate the behavior of both protocols
during their successive n-th sojourn time in A and B. Each Markov chain X is
irreducible and aperiodic since at least one state has a transition to itself. For
n ≥ 1, we denote by respectively T
(i)
A,n and T
(i)
B,n the time spent by Markov chain X
associated with Protocoli during its n-th sojourn in respectively subsets A and B.
Expectations of T
(i)
A,n and T
(i)
B,n are respectively given for i = 1, 2 by
E(T
(i)
A,n) = vG
n−1(I − PA)
−1
✶ and E(T
(i)
B,n) = wH
n−1(I − PB)
−1
✶ (15)
where v = αA + αB(I − PB)
−1PBA, G = (I − PA)
−1PAB(I − PB)
−1PBA, w =
αB + αA(I − PA)
−1PAB and H = (I − PB)
−1PBA(I − PA)
−1PAB .
For both protocols, the Markov chain X is finite, irreducible and aperiodic so
the stationary distribution exists and is unique. We denote by π the stationary
distribution of the Markov chain X. The row vector π is thus the unique solution
to the linear system πP = π and π✶ = 1. As we did for row vector α, we partition
vector π according to the partition Ω = A ∪ B by writing π = (πA πB), where
sub-vector πA (resp. πB) contains the stationary probabilities of states of A (resp.
B). The mean percentage of time spent in subset A during the j-th sojourn is equal
for Protocoli (i=1,2) to E(T
(i)
A,j)/(E(T
(i)
A,j) + E(T
(i)
B,j)). By Cesa`ro lemma,
lim
n→∞
∑n
j=1E(T
(i)
A,j)∑n
j=1(E(T
(i)
A,j) + E(T
(i)
B,j))
= lim
n→∞
E(T
(i)
A,n)
E(T
(i)
A,n) + E(T
(i)
B,n)
= πA✶ (16)
and the first hitting time to reach subset B is given, for every k ≥ 0, by
P{T
(i)
A,1 ≤ k} = 1− αA(PA)
k
✶.
Figures 8(a) and 8(b) show the behavior of the Markov chains associated with
both protocols during their first 11 sojourn times in both A and B. First, for
µ = 25% both protocols spend more than 3/4 of their time in safe states and their
convergence speed to πA✶ is very fast (convergence is reached in a single step for
Protocol1 and in 6 steps for Protocol2) as shown in Figure 8(a). Figure 8(b) shows
that the frequency at which safe and polluted states alternate is 3 times lower for
Protocol1 than for Protocol2. From a practical point of view this is interesting as
it makes Protocol1 more adapted to dynamic environment compared to Protocol2
(i.e., Protocol1 handles a higher number of connections and disconnections before
switching to a polluted state than Protocol2 does).
Theorem 1. For both protocols, the stationary distribution π is equal to β, i.e. for
all x = 0, . . . , c and y = 0, . . . , s, we have
lim
n−→∞
P{Xn = (x, y)} = β(x, y) with β(x, y) given by relation (2).
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We have α = β, c = 10, s = 20 and µ = 25%.
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Fig. 8. Comparison of sojourn times in safe and polluted states.
Proof. For space reason, the proof appears in [22].
Theorem 1 is quite interesting as it shows that the steady state of the system
which is described by the stationary distribution π is exactly the same for both
protocols, and that this distribution is equal to distribution β (independently from
the initial distribution). At a first glance, we could guess that this phenomenon is
due to the fact that the Markov chain X is the tensor product of two independent
Markov chains. However, this is clearly not the case as the behavior of red balls
in C depends on the behavior of red balls in S. This holds for both protocols. The
stationary availability of the system defined by the long run probability to be in
safe states is denoted by Psafe and is given by
Psafe = πA✶ =
c′∑
x=0
(
c
x
)
µx(1− µ)c−x.
This probability can also be interpreted as the long run proportion of time spent in
safe states. Note that the stationary distribution does not depend on the size of S.
6. Robustness of the Overlay Network
We now show that by inducing global churn, we can preserve the safety of the
system. We consider that we have ℓ identical and independent Markov chains
X(1), . . . , X(ℓ) on the same state space Ω = A ∪ B, with initial probability dis-
tribution α and transition probability matrix P . Each Markov chain X(i) models a
particular cluster of peers and, for n ≥ 0, Nn represents the number of safe clusters
after the n-th round, i.e. the number of Markov chains being in subset A after the
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Fig. 9. Percentage of the expected number of safe clusters (relation (18)) as a function of
the rounds number n for both protocols, for two different initial states X0 (Section 4.3.1).
In these experiments, ℓ = 100, c = 10, s = 20, and µ = 25%.
n-th transition has been triggered, defined by Nn =
∑ℓ
i=1 1{X(i)n ∈A}
. The ℓ Markov
chains being identical and independent, Nn has a binomial distribution, that is, for
k = 0, . . . , ℓ
P{Nn = k} =
(
ℓ
k
)
(αPn✶)
k
(1− αPn✶)ℓ−k and E(Nn) = ℓαP
n
✶. (18)
If N denotes the stationary number of safe clusters, we have
E(N) =
{
ℓπA✶ for a constrained adversary
0 for a non constrained adversary
(19)
These results are illustrated in Figure 9. The main observation is that with a
constrained adversary, the expected number of safe clusters for both protocols tends
to the same limit ℓπA✶ whatever the amount of initial pollution, while with a non
constrained adversary all clusters get eventually polluted. This clearly shows that
by limiting the time spent by peers at the same position in the overlay, targeted
attacks are tolerated.
7. Practical Significance of the Results
In this section, we evaluate the practical significance of our results when instantiated
with real traces. Traces we are referring to have been collected in the Overnet file
sharing network and analyzed in [23]. The main reasons for using these traces is
that Overnet peers are identified by permanent IDs which allows to observe fine-
grained behavior of active peers in the overlay. Traces which were collected for a
period of 15 days have shown that every day between 70, 000 and 90, 000 peers IDs
are present in the overlay. It has been registered that each peer triggers in average
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6.4 join and leave events per day, that is in average each peer joins the overlay every
7.5 hours. Thus, for an average population of 80, 000 peers, this makes 512 970 join
and leave events per day. In our context, an average population of U = 80, 000 peers
leads to around ℓ = U/⌊log2 U⌋ = 5, 000 clusters each populated by ⌊log2 U⌋ = 16
peers, and thus to around U/ℓ × 3.2 = 52 leave-join rounds per day per cluster.
Thus, in a presence of a non-constrained adversary, extrapolation of Figure 7 shows
that for µ = 5%, c = 10 and for s = 6, it takes one day and a half (i.e., 85 rounds)
for the adversary to definitively pollute a targeted cluster when Protocol1 is run
while it takes 5 days (i.e., 260 rounds) when Protocol2 is used. Moreover, in the
presence of a constrained adversary, one can derive from our study the average
lifetime that must be imposed on malicious peers to prevent pollution. This comes
down to compute the average frequency at which a cluster becomes polluted which
is given by 1/(αAPAB✶). Coming back to the traces, for c = 10, s = 6 and µ = 5%,
peers must leave their cluster every 104 days (5455 rounds) when Protocol1 is run
and every 41 days (i.e., 2152 rounds) when Protocol2 is used to prevent pollution.
Now, when µ = 25%, malicious peers need to leave every 20 hours (i.e., 45 rounds)
with Protocol1 and every 7 hours (i.e., 2152 rounds) with Protocol2. Clearly these
frequencies remain fully compatible with the rate at which honest peers have been
observed to leave the system (i.e., every 24/3, 2 = 7.5 hours in average). This clearly
show the practicability of the induced churn approach in large scale systems.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a mechanism that enables the enforcement of
limited peers lifetime compliant with DHT-based overlays specificities. We have
investigated the long run behavior of several adversarial strategies. Our analysis
has demonstrated that an adversary can easily subvert a cluster-based overlay by
simply never triggering leave operations. We have shown that when peers have to
regularly leave the system, a stationary regime where the ratio of malicious peers
is bounded is eventually reached. Finally, we have shown that this induced churn
is fully compatible with the natural churn observed in peer-to-peer systems, which
makes our approach definitively adapted to large scale and open systems.
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